Psychologists have been interested for many years in topics that involve excessive self-preoccupation, such as egocentrism, self-enhancement, and narcissism. But only in the last 15 years or so have researchers turned their attention to phenomena that are characterized by a low level of egoicism, such as humility, forgiveness, and empathy.
Humility has been conceptualized and measured in a number of ways, often on the basis of ordinary, lay beliefs about humble people, which is not a good basis for scientific theorizing. Because these conceptualizations differ in important ways, not all research on “humility” necessarily deals with the same phenomenon.
Most scholarly discussions of humility provide a set of characteristics that describe humble people, many of them stemming from June Tangney’s ground-breaking analysis of six primary features of humility. According to Tangney, humble people: have an accurate view of themselves, acknowledge their mistakes and limitations, are open to other viewpoints and ideas, keep their accomplishments and abilities in perspective, have a low self-focus, and appreciate the value of all things, including other people.
Many researchers have adopted this description of humble people at face value, and it is probably correct on average. But simply identifying the characteristics of humble people falls short of providing a conceptualization of the fundamental nature of humility. (Indeed, Tangney did not intend her description as an explanation or theory of humility.) And, simply describing what humble people are like does not distinguish the psychological processes that underlie humility from the behaviors that are associated with it.
Most importantly, none of characteristics in popular descriptions can be regarded as a necessary or sufficient indicator of humility. For example, many researchers have noted that humble people have an accurate view of their strengths and weaknesses, but the accuracy of a person’s self-views does not distinguish an arrogant person from a humble one.
My students and I wanted to go beyond descriptions of people who are low versus high in humility to identify the specific psychological quality that might underlie humility. Our question was: What one thing would we want to know about someone, psychologically speaking, that would provide a strong, valid indicator that he or she is responding in a humble fashion in the current situation (state humility) or is generally a humble person (trait humility)?
My hunch was that humility is characterized by the belief that, no matter how great one’s accomplishments or positive characteristics may be, they do not entitle one to be treated special as a person. So, for example, a renowned actor may know that he is exceptionally skilled, has a highly successful career, has received many awards, and is adored by his fans but not believe that he should be treated special overall, as a person, because of his exceptional ability and accomplishments.
The phrase “as a person” is central here. In certain areas of life, people who perform at a high level or who have exceptionally positive characteristics deserve special attention, respect, deference, perks, and privileges in the domain in which their accomplishments or characteristics are relevant. For example, the best athletes should be given more playing time than less skilled players, accomplished scientists may deserve more awards and better grant funding, and the best employees are entitled to a higher salary, a better office, or other benefits. But receiving special treatment commensurate with one’s accomplishments when meritocratic norms are operating is irrelevant to humility.
Although social norms often stipulate that people be treated special within the domains of their accomplishments, norms do not generally dictate that exemplary people should be accorded special treatment outside of those domains. The best athletes, scientists, and employees are not generally entitled to be treated differently in contexts in which sports, science, or their jobs are not involved.
Yet, people sometimes believe that they should be treated differently in general because of who they are or what they have done. This belief that other people should treat them differently as a person because of their accomplishments or positive characteristics—what we call “egoic entitlement”—is the cornerstone of low humility.
In contrast, humble people do not expect to be treated special as a person no matter how outstanding their accomplishments or personal characteristics may be. Humble people may recognize, and even acknowledge, that their accomplishments or characteristics are exceptional in some respect, yet they do not display egoic entitlement. They don’t think that they should be treated special as a person.
My student, Chloe Banker, and I conducted two studies to test the idea that humility is characterized by the belief that one is not entitled to be treated special because of one’s accomplishments or characteristics. We had research participants complete measures of humility and related constructs, identify and rate their positive accomplishments and characteristics, and indicate how they believed they should be treated because of them.
As we expected, participants who scored higher in humility were less likely to believe that they should be treated special because of their accomplishments and positive characteristics. Interestingly, however, humility was not related to participants’ ratings of the positivity of their accomplishments or characteristics or of themselves. So, humble people didn’t downplay their accomplishments or characteristics—they simply didn’t think they should be treated special because of them.
For Further Reading
Leary, M. R., & Banker, C. (2020). Hypo-egoic nonentitlement as a feature of humility. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 46, 738-753.
A previous version of this blog appeared on Mark Leary’s blog “Toward a Less Egoic World” at psychologytoday.com: https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/toward-less-egoic-world
Mark Leary is Garonzik Professor Emeritus of Psychology and Neuroscience at Duke University and Editor of Character and Context.