Hypocrisy is often viewed negatively and reflects poorly on moral character. Yet hypocrisy is also common in our social world. People elect hypocrites to office, they buy products from hypocritical companies, and they may even behave hypocritically in everyday social interactions. If hypocrisy is so negative, why are hypocritical individuals, leaders, and organizations supported and trusted? We address this question in recent research examining the social consequences of hypocrisy in the context of honesty.

Studying hypocrisy in the context of honesty is interesting because people hold divergent private and public beliefs about honesty. Many people promote absolute norms of truth-telling ("honesty is the best policy") publicly, but people also admit that they do lie in everyday life and even find lying to be ethical at times. For example, many people think it is sometimes okay to lie to protect another person's feelings. If people frequently lie and think lying can be appropriate at times, but simultaneously support policies of absolute honesty publicly, at least some hypocrisy is taking place. In our work, we look at judgments of hypocrites who promote absolute norms of truth-telling—that it is never okay to lie—but then lie, compared to judgments of those who admit to holding flexible views on honesty (it is sometimes okay to lie) and then lie.

Across six studies, we find that people evaluate hypocrites who endorse absolute honesty and then lie more positively than consistent communicators who take flexible stances on honesty prior to lying. People view the hypocrites as more moral and are more willing to trust them. In political scenarios, people indicate stronger voting intentions for hypocritical politicians who endorse absolute honesty prior to lying than those who take flexible honesty stances and tell the same lies. Even people who admit that they believe it is sometimes okay to lie, still evaluate others who endorse absolute honesty and lie more positively compared to those who take nuanced views on lying. Why is hypocrisy viewed more positively than flexibility in the context of honesty?

We argue that absolute honesty stances are viewed as indicating stronger commitment to honesty and greater likelihood of future honest behavior. If a communicator says it is never okay to lie, people interpret this stance as genuine. When the communicator then lies, hypocrisy does slightly diminish expectations of future honesty, but not greatly. Although hypocrisy is often viewed so negatively that it discredits people's words completely, we find that people do not entirely discredit hypocritical honesty stances. Absolute honesty stances are not dismissed when communicators lie—they are still viewed as a reliable signal of communicators' values and future behaviors regarding honesty.

In fact, we found a strong "moral flexibility penalty" throughout our research. Admitting that lying is sometimes okay leads to low moral evaluations and expectations of future honesty, regardless of one's behavior. This flexibility penalty is severe enough that hypocritical communicators are evaluated more positively and trusted more than the communicators endorsing flexible honesty when lying, even though the flexible stance accurately describes and aligns with deceptive behavior.

Furthermore, we find that communicators anticipate these results themselves. In one study, we surveyed local government officials across the United States and found that officials predicted that their constituents would trust them more for hypocritically endorsing absolute honesty and lying than if they had admitted to holding flexible honesty views and lied. In other words, these officials expected that moral flexibility would be more costly than hypocrisy.

As long as people anticipate the severe social costs of acknowledging moral nuance, they are likely to endorse absolute honesty stances publicly—even when these stances do not actually reflect their private beliefs or behaviors. By highlighting this tension, our research helps to explain why hypocrisy is so pervasive. Hypocrisy still has negative consequences but an alternative to hypocrisy—admission to moral nuance—is even worse.


For Further Reading

Huppert, E., Herzog, N., Landy, J. F., & Levine, E. (2023). On being honest about dishonesty: The social costs of taking nuanced (but realistic) moral stances. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000340

Jordan, J. J., Sommers, R., Bloom, P., & Rand, D. G. (2017). Why do we hate hypocrites? Evidence for a theory of false signaling. Psychological Science, 28(3), 356-368. https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976166857

Jordan, J., & Sommers, R. (2022). When does moral engagement risk triggering a hypocrisy penalty? Current Opinion in Psychology, 101404. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101404


Elizabeth Huppert is a postdoctoral fellow at the Dispute Resolution Research Center (DRRC) at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University researching moral judgment.